Microeconomic Reform in Papua New Guinea: the big challenge by Yala, Charles & Duncan, Ronald
1Economic survey
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 21 Number 1 2006 © Asia Pacific Press
Microeconomic reform in
Papua New Guinea:
the big challenge
Charles Yala and Ron Duncan
Charles Yala is Senior
Research Fellow, Economic
Studies Division, National
Research Institute, Port
Moresby.
Ron Duncan is Executive
Director, Pacific Institute of
Advanced Studies in
Development and Governance,
University of the South Pacific,
Suva.
In this year’s economic survey of Papua New
Guinea, we look at the possibilities for reaching the
forms and levels of investment necessary to raise
income and employment, and thus accommodate
the population growth expected over the next 25
years. By 2029, the population aged 15–29 years will
have increased by around one million to 2.6 million.
We look at what the present government has done
to establish the conditions necessary for income and
jobs growth that will satisfy these young people’s
expectations.
Establishing the conditions necessary for
much more rapid income and jobs growth is
essentially about the microeconomic reforms
needed to provide the environment for
development of a competitive private sector.
Whereas macroeconomic stabilisation and
reform appear relatively easy to achieve in
Papua New Guinea—as seen in the rapid
return to macroeconomic stability in the
wake of the several periods of economic
instability since independence—adoption of
microeconomic reforms has proven very
difficult. Why? Answering this question is
important because poor microeconomic
policies appear to be a critical reason for
Papua New Guinea’s poor economic growth
performance.
Here, we first examine the kinds of
investment likely to provide income and
employment opportunities. Then the micro-
economic reforms needed for such investment
to take place are considered. We then look
back over Papua New Guinea’s experiences
with microeconomic reform to see why it has
proven so difficult. Finally, we examine what
the present government has done to implement
the needed reforms, looking particularly at
the government’s intentions with regard to
microeconomic reform in the Medium-Term
Development Strategy (MTDS) and the 2006
Budget.
Opportunities for rapid income
and jobs growth
The development strategy followed in Papua
New Guinea since independence is made up
of three parts—development of mineral, oil
and gas resources; assistance to manu-
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facturing industry through import restrictions;
and development of export cash crops
through both plantations and smallholder
farming. Light processing has been the
industry most favoured by import restrictions,
principally food processing and packaging.
Protecting such activities is not highly
damaging to an economy, but like all such
protection it does raise costs for consumers
and other businesses. These industries,
moreover, are usually capital-intensive and
therefore do not create much in the way of
employment. But import protection of some
manufacturing activities does damage other
productive activities through raising costs
of production: these protected industries
include cement production and steel
fabrication. Cement and fabricated steel are
critical inputs into most forms of infra-
structure and buildings and therefore raise
costs of most fixed investments. It appears
very difficult for non-economists to under-
stand that granting assistance to firms
through protection against imports is
effectively the same thing as taxing exports
and therefore cannot be a successful develop-
ment strategy.
Development of Papua New Guinea’s
mineral and oil and gas resources has been
the major preoccupation of its governments.
Papua New Guinea is certainly rich in such
natural resources in per capita terms, and it
is desirable that they be developed, but
mining is an activity that produces relatively
few jobs. Moreover, it is unlikely that there
will be much in the way of downstream
processing of the materials extracted in Papua
New Guinea as it is a highly capital-
intensive activity. The key issue with respect
to the extraction of non-renewable resources
is what is done with the revenue retained in
the country, that is, the revenues shared by
the governments and the landowners.
Because these natural resource assets are
destroyed when mined, it is extremely
important that a large share of the revenues
going to governments and landowners is
used to create other assets that will generate
income streams and jobs. Unfortunately,
PNG governments appear to have failed in
this very important function. It is difficult to
point to where public assets such as physical
infrastructure and social assets such as
education and health have benefited from the
large government revenues received from
mining over the past 30 years. An extreme case
of such government failure is Nauru, which
exhausted nearly all of its phosphate reserves
and is left with virtually no replacement
assets.
Landowner revenues from mining also
do not appear to have created much in the
way of physical capital (in the form of
businesses) or social capital (in the form of
better education and health). The poor
investment environment in Papua New
Guinea provides little in the way of incentives
for people to save and invest. Customary
ownership of land is not attractive to
individual private investment. If customary
landowners receive mining revenues, they are
more likely to invest in freehold land than in
their customary-owned land. Because there
is little freehold land available in Papua
New Guinea, this means that the prices bid
for freehold land are very high.
Like so many other mineral-rich
developing countries, Papua New Guinea
has suffered from the rent-seeking that
accompanies the availability of large streams
of resource revenues. Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian (2003) have shown that natural
resources that generate easily-appropriated
revenues, such as oils and minerals, can
negatively affect a country’s long-run growth
by diminishing the quality of that country’s
institutions. In turn, the less effective the
country’s institutions, particularly its
oversight institutions, the more widespread
corruption is likely to be. The ease with which
public officials have been able to appropriate
mining and other resource revenues, such as
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from logging, appears to have contributed to
the lack of development resulting from the
vast mining revenues earned by governments
in Papua New Guinea.
The failure of PNG governments to invest
a significant share of the income generated
from the sale of the non-renewable minerals
assets in replacements assets was illustrated
in the AusAID (1995) country report on Papua
New Guinea. That report showed that, over
the period 1984–94, net investment (that is,
after adjusting gross investment for the
consumption of fixed capital and estimates of
the depletion of mineral and forestry assets)
averaged less than 10 per cent of GDP and
had fallen in the early 1990s to such an extent
that by 1994 it had become negative, that is,
net disinvestment. The point of that exercise
was to illustrate how poorly the income from
the depletion of natural resources had been
managed.
While lasting public and private benefits
from mining revenues have been so
disappointing, it is very likely that investment
in mining is far lower than it should be. In a
sense this may be a good thing, as until
mining revenues can be better managed it
may be best to leave the resources in the
ground. Investment in mining in Papua New
Guinea is likely to be less than it should be
because of the insecurity of access to land for
mining companies and the undeveloped and
insecure nature of infrastructure to support
mining—such as transport infrastructure,
pipelines and telecommunications. Capital
for development of minerals resources is not
a constraint, particularly for large-scale
investments, as this will generally be sourced
overseas.
Forest logging is also a natural resource
enclave activity generating little downstream
processing. The government has attempted
to promote downstream processing by
providing support to activities in the form of
protection against imports and subsidies, but
if downstream activities need government
assistance on a long-term basis—as appears
to be the case—there is no good reason why
these activities should receive such
assistance, at the expense of consumers and
taxpayers, instead of any other activities. The
management regimes for logging appear
highly ineffective, yielding low returns to
landowners, promoting unsustainable
harvesting rates, reducing biodiversity, and
generating corruption (Duncan 1994). It is still
an open question whether high-intensity
logging of tropical forests can sustain those
forests as a renewable resource. Only time will
tell. It would seem wise, however, to ensure
that a substantial share of the revenues from
forestry is used to build replacement assets.
Many of these arguments apply to tuna
fishing and processing. If it can be undertaken
by domestic or foreign investors without
government assistance, all well and good,
but there is no economic justification for
providing special assistance to either
domestic or foreign interests to undertake
these activities. The major problem with
harvesting tuna, not only in Papua New
Guinea but throughout the Pacific, is that the
management regimes providing access to the
resource appear to be generating over-fishing
of at least some tuna species, while the Pacific
countries’ share of the revenue from the
harvest is too small and declining. Better
management regimes are required that will
ensure sustainable harvests, higher and more
stable returns to the Pacific countries, and
reduce the high-level corruption seemingly
associated with the allocation of access
licences. Schemes that give fishing firms
access at low rates in exchange for investing
in land-based processing activities are highly
undesirable—in particular, because there is
no way of judging whether the country’s
share of the fishing revenue has been
maximised (Duncan and Temu 1997).
We consider agricultural land Papua
New Guinea’s important natural resource,
and we believe effective exploitation of this
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resource will provide the best basis for rapid,
sustainable income growth that is well
distributed throughout society. The bulk of
Papua New Guinea’s population relies on
agricultural land—usually held under
collective ownership—for its livelihood. To
improve these people’s welfare, the
productivity of land must be improved. The
limited evidence indicates that agricultural
productivity is not increasing in Papua New
Guinea (Reddy and Duncan forthcoming).
Increases in agricultural productivity will
only come from increased capital investment,
technological improvements, and greater and
higher-quality individual effort. These
improvements in farm inputs require security
of land tenure, access to credit, good
infrastructure for farmers to have access to
commercial inputs and for getting their output
to markets reliably and at low cost, marketing
information, and research that yields new and
improved crops and farming systems.
This issue of the journal includes several
articles that illustrate well the various
elements of the debate in Papua New Guinea
over the mobilisation of land held under
customary ownership. This debate is perhaps
in its healthiest state, and hopefully ways to
improve the mobilisation of customary-owned
land will soon be agreed. Our view is that this
outcome will best be achieved by the
development of secure long-term leasehold of
customary land that will provide individual
investors the necessary incentives to put their
time and capital into agriculture.
The underdevelopment of tourism in
Papua New Guinea is one of the most
disappointing features of the PNG economy.
As argued by Duncan and Lawson (1997),
Papua New Guinea has few rivals in terms of
the richness of its natural resources as a basis
for tourism, in the form of the diversity of its
culture, the brilliance of its bird life, its
wonderful coral reef environments, its
topography, and its historical significance for
people of many nations. Unfortunately, Papua
New Guinea has fewer tourists than even
most of the tiny Pacific island countries. By
comparison, Fiji had over 500,000 tourists in
2005. The blame for Papua New Guinea’s
poor performance in tourism can be laid at
many doors, namely, concerns about personal
security, health risks (malaria, infectious
diseases as the result of poor sanitation, and
now concerns over the rapid spread of HIV/
AIDS), poor transport infrastructure, high-cost
and unreliable essential services such as
electricity, water, and telecommunications,
and insecurity of property rights for investors
in resort development.
Unlike the development of natural
resources such as minerals, oil and gas, and
forests, tourism in developing countries is a
labour-intensive activity, involving people
working in activities such as restaurants,
transport, and the production of foods, as well
as in the resort hotels themselves. For several
of the Pacific island countries, tourism is
becoming an important part of the economy.
In Papua New Guinea, however, many
obstacles have to be overcome to create the
conditions that will lead investors and tourists
to view it favourably as a tourist destination.
The potential appears huge, though the
problems to be overcome are also huge.
Microeconomic reforms needed
It is becoming more widely believed that, for
a country to have strong, sustained economic
growth that is well distributed, it must have
institutions and policies that provide an
encouraging environment for private sector
development. The most important of such
institutions are secure property rights and
impartial enforcement of contracts, which in
turn depend upon an independent law and
justice system and the absence of discretionary
interventions by politicians and bureaucrats
in the enforcement of property rights and
contracts. Freedom of internal and external
trade is the manifestation of these basic
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institutions working effectively. Free trade
means the absence of discrimination of any
form so that all people in a society have the
opportunity to develop their capacities to the
full, can save and invest without restrictions,
and can exploit their ideas and energy to the
full.
Microeconomic reform is essentially
about reaching this preferred state. That is,
the goal of microeconomic reform is to
achieve secure property rights to land and
other property, for people to have freedom to
make contracts in the knowledge that the
contracts will be honoured and enforced, for
there to be no restrictions on savings and
investment (domestic or foreign), the absence
of government intervention in the operation
of markets, only essential regulation of
private sector activity, effective regulation
against the establishment of monopolies, and
for the private sector to undertake essential
services where this can be shown to reduce
the cost and/or improve the quality of the
services provided.
Generally, microeconomic reform appears
much more difficult to implement than
macroeconomic reform because the costs of
the adjustment to reforms such as trade
liberalisation, privatisation, and public
sector reform are obvious to the affected
labour and capital and the costs are immediate
while the benefits are not obvious, are widely
dispersed, and occur over a long period of
time. Moreover, because those adversely
affected by the reforms are concentrated
geographically, it is relatively easy for them
to organise resistance against the reforms.
However, other factors are also important in
the success or failure of reforms and we
discuss these below, with particular reference
to Papua New Guinea.
Some of the microeconomic reform needed
in Papua New Guinea has been implied in
the above discussion about the development
strategies adopted and the poor government
management of Papua New Guinea’s natural
resources. Trade policy, particularly the
assistance provided to individual firms and
industries, has been improving. A tariff
reduction program which has been underway
for some time and has been maintained in
the face of pressure from firms and industries
favoured under the previous regime. A few
industries, however, continue to receive
high levels of protection, therefore raising
costs for other industries that could be
more profitable and able to export more
competitively in the absence of the protection.
Liberalisation of investment, for both
domestic and foreign investment, has not
progressed far. The World Bank’s Foreign
Investment Advisory Service  has carried out
a study of investment legislation and
regulation and recommended significant
changes to improve the investment climate
in Papua New Guinea, but little progress has
been made on this.
Factors affecting microeconomic
reform
In our review of microeconomic reform
experience in Papua New Guinea, we look
at four areas where reform has been
attempted. One of these may be considered a
success, another appears to have been a
failure,  the third a partial success and the
fourth a protracted affair. We explore the
possible reasons for the different outcomes
and see what lessons may be taken from this
experience for future reform efforts.
Privatisation
Unlike many other developing countries,
Papua New Guinea did not establish a large
number of state-owned enterprises. Moreover,
several of the government enterprises that
were established have been privatised.
Privatisation of the Papua New Guinea
Banking Corporation has been among the
successes. The telecommunications company,
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Telikom, was to be the next major
privatisation, but this was prevented in 2004
by the introduction of a private member’s bill.
It is worth pointing out that the current
government’s policy of restructuring state-
owned enterprises before privatisation
contrasts with the growing international
evidence that it does not pay to restructure
(Guriev and Megginson 2006). Then Prime
Minister Morauta’s point that the nation has
to choose between service and ownership is
theoretically sound and empirically well
supported (The National, 18 July 2001). The
growing body of studies focusing on the
welfare effects of privatisation, summarised
in Guriev and Megginson (2006), show that
substantial benefits accrue, especially to the
lower income groups. One example cited
from Argentina showed reductions in child
mortality (saving about 500 young lives every
year) from privatisation of water facilities
(Galiani et al. 2001).
In the case of Papua New Guinea,
privatisation can be seen as a mixed bag of
successful and failed microeconomic reform
initiatives. The packaging and marketing of
the reform agenda appears to be one of the
problems. The choice between ownership
and service and the strong theoretical
foundations and growing evidence in favour
of the latter should be properly packaged and
sold to the public. The main source of
opposition is the rent-seeking of individuals
who directly benefit from the status quo.
Providing incentives for other sectors is one
way of gaining their support or of nullifying
their opposition. As Prime Minister Mekere
Morauta showed by successfully privatising
the Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation,
despite the opposition led by students and
trade unions, reformist leaders can bring
about change in the face of resistance.
Public sector reform
Public sector reform has been a protracted
affair in Papua New Guinea. Reform
initiatives have been trialed in every decade
since the country gained independence
(Kavanamur et al. 2004). The latest was the
Public Sector Right-sizing initiative
undertaken in 2005, but with the  committee’s
report still confidential, and its recommend-
ations unimplemented, the initiative seems
likely to be another failure.
Public sector reform is likely to remain a
protracted affair for several reasons. First,
reform attempts fail to recognise it as a fiscal
policy issue. Establishing the optimal fiscal
capacity for the public service remains the
ideal approach. Therefore, public sector
reform should be complemented by compre-
hensive fiscal policy reforms that include a
review of the country’s revenue base,
including tax and non-tax revenues, and
donor aid and grants. Second, the small size
of the private sector relative to the public
sector is a disincentive for public sector
reform. Under such circumstances, rent-
seeking and cronyism are to be expected,
particularly the allocation of public contracts
to politicians’ friends and relatives. Public
sector reform in Papua New Guinea cannot
succeed without the development of the
private sector. Moreover, this development has
to take place under open market conditions
and not be dependent on government favours.
Third, reforms to relax the control of
information by a minority of élites are difficult
given the strong incentives for individuals to
remain loyal to their own network. The well-
connected will prefer to use the information
selectively to pursue private interests. Fourth,
poor packaging of the reform agenda has been
another factor impeding progress. The poor
implementation of the privatisation initiative
and major political reforms (the provincial
government reforms and creation of new
electorates) has contributed to the increased
size of the public sector. Fifth, the international
donor community’s continued emphasis on
social sectors has contributed to the
increasing reliance on the government sector
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for post-project life. The last factor contributes
significantly to the recurrent budget over
time.
Land reform
Attempts to develop a formal tenure system
for accessing customary land for individual
activity have largely failed in Papua New
Guinea (Larmour 2002, 2003). However, the
debate over customary land reform continues.
Historically, attempts at land reform began
with a series of land settlement trials during
the 1950s (Cheetham 1963; Hulme 1984;
Wright 2002). The nucleus-estate farm model
adopted by the oil palm industry (Christensen
1986; Grieve 1986) is a hybrid of the land
settlement trials. Given the success of the
nucleus-estate model, it has been adopted in
the rice, cattle and chicken industries.
During the 1950s, rapid alienation of
customary land for agricultural development
and land settlement took place. These trials
were aimed at developing indigenous
agriculture.
The idea was conceived as a voluntary
process for the development of private
property rights over customary land. It was
expected that, once successful, a settlement
family’s standard of living would be above
that of the majority of the villager farmers. The
expected change in the settler family’s life was
expected to stimulate demand for private
property rights, which would engender a
favourable attitude toward the conversion of
customary land to land with formal
individual titles, and expand indigenous
agricultural development (Cheetham 1963).
This policy was underpinned by then
Territories Minister Paul Hasluck’s conviction
in retaining customary land under indigenous
control (Wright 2002). The Commission of
Inquiry into Land Matters (CILM) established
in 1973 was the major pre-independence
attempt to bring about land reform. The thrust
of the Commission’s recommendations was
to revert alienated land to customary control.
The four subsequent Acts that implemented
the Plantation Redistribution Scheme
indicate the significance of this policy intent.
These are the Land Acquisitions Act 1974,
the Land Registration Act 1974, the Land
Groups Act 1974, and the Land Trespass Act
1974. These Acts remain in place. There was
no subsequent political interest in land
reform until 1994/95, when the World Bank
included land reform as one of the conditions
of the structural adjustment program. A
second attempt to reform customary land
tenure was made in 2001 by the Morauta
Government. Both attempts failed because of
strong opposition from non-government
organisations, students and trade unions.
Most of these attempts at land reform
have been inspired intellectually by foreign
sources and actors. Indigenous people, being
an integral part of the matter under
consideration, are more aware of the cultural
context in which the issues are discussed.
Achieving an appropriate balance within the
diverse cultures of Papua New Guinea is a
difficult task, even for indigenous people.
Understanding the drivers of reform is
therefore important. In that context, the
Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters
was introduced at a time when the country
was in the mood for independence, whereas
the reform attempted in 1995 occurred in
the middle of a financial crisis, and was
imposed by an external body, the World
Bank. The 2001 attempt was introduced by a
reformist prime minister but was hampered
by being initiated at the end of the
parliamentary term. Furthermore, the
government was concurrently pushing a
major privatisation program in which the
largest commercial bank had just been
privatised and the monopolist telecommun-
ications company was next in line. Students
and non-government organisations, riding
the bandwagon of potential political
candidates and losers from the privatisation
program, opposed land reform.
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These experiences show that sequencing
of reforms, packaging of reforms, and
championing and marketing of reforms are
important elements of the reform process.
While the land debate has remained
mainly a preoccupation of academics and a
few policymakers, the mainstream national
policy machinery has not committed to any
land reform agenda for most of the post-
independence period. However, the Minister
for Lands and Physical Planning has initiated
a new reform attempt that encompasses a
review of land administration and land
arbitration for both customary and alienated
state land, and the development of customary
land. The process began with the National
Lands Summit in 2005 and the establishment
of a National Land Development Taskforce.
To increase ownership of the outcome, key
PNG institutions and government depart-
ments are engaged, as are indigenous experts.
The success of this reform attempt, however,
is yet to be measured.
Labour market reforms
The Minimum Wages Board regulated
minimum wages for most of the period from
independence until 1992, setting the urban
minimum wage at around three times the
rural minimum wage. Adjustments were
determined by a tripartite agreement involving
trade unions, employer associations and the
government.
This regulation spurred more rapid
rural–urban migration, leading to law and
order problems and high urban wage costs,
both of which restricted private sector develop-
ment. In 1992, the wage-setting system was
reformed under pressure from the World Bank.
A single national minimum wage was
established by reducing the urban minimum
wage to the level of the rural minimum. Direct
negotiations between employers and
employees were to determine wage rates above
the national minimum wage. For new
entrants, the minimum wage was set at 75 per
cent of the national minimum.
The labour market deregulation can be
seen as a successful microeconomic reform.
Consideration of the factors leading to this
success provides useful lessons. First, there
was extensive academic analysis involved
in arguing the case for reform, providing
theoretical and empirical support for the
reform. Second, at that time the trade union
movement was disorganised (Kavanamur
and Okole 2005). The reform succeeded in
stimulating employment, but the general
decline in economic activity at the time offset
the gains (Levantis 2000). This highlights the
importance of packaging reform programs
for maximum impact. In that respect,
complementary microeconomic reforms
failed in important areas such as investment,
land mobilisation, and the development of
institutions to strengthen the rule of law and
enforcement of justice.
Lessons from other countries
In 2002, the Global Development Network
launched the ‘Understanding Reform’
project. The main purpose of the project was
to increase knowledge about designing and
implementing economic reforms by comparing
reform experiences across developing
countries. The seven thematic papers reached
the following conclusions, as summarised
by Fanellie and McMahon (2005).
• There is no single definite and complete
blueprint for reform. An imported
prescription may be misleading for those
designing and implementing reforms.
• The existence of an effective state
endowed with an efficient bureaucracy
cannot be taken for granted. In fact, the
reform process appears to be more a
matter of learning-by-doing and
building-while-doing. Policy ownership
greatly assists.
• Understanding the political economy of
the country is important. Distributive
conflicts and the role of interest groups
matter.
9Economic survey
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 21 Number 1 2006 © Asia Pacific Press
• The reform process should be conceived
as institutional change. Moreover, an
institution must be considered in the
general context in which it functions.
• Reforms do not occur in a political
vacuum. The polity is the source of the
rule of law and governance. Political and
economic reforms therefore coexist.
These lessons from the Understanding
Reform project provide useful insights and
support for the above analysis of the
experience with microeconomic reform in
Papua New Guinea. The overall message is
that there is no magic formula. Each country
must develop its own reform agenda.
The Somare government’s
microeconomic reform efforts
The current Somare Government has
experienced a period of political stability not
seen for many years in Papua New Guinea.
Good government-expenditure control,
together with the increased revenues from
the high prices for petroleum and gold, has
provided scope for the government to reduce
the public debt substantially. When the
government took office the public debt/GDP
ratio was over 70 per cent, but is expected to
fall to 50 per cent by the end of 2005. The
budget surplus, low interest rates, low
inflation, and the high level of foreign
exchange reserves reflect improved
macroeconomic management, which should
provide an encouraging environment for
investment. However, the rapid growth in
investment and the kind of investment
needed for rapid and widely distributed
income growth has not been forthcoming.
The economy has barely achieved a growth
rate of real GDP equal to population growth.
The government’s inability to improve the
investment climate basically derives from the
ongoing minerals sector-led development
strategy and an incapacity or unwillingness
to implement the necessary changes in
microeconomic institutions and policies.
In August 2002, the Somare Government
established the Program for Recovery and
Development (PRD). The intention of the
Medium Term Development Strategy (MTDS)
2003–07 (which was drafted but not
implemented) and later the MTDS 2005–10
was to put the PRD into operation. The PRD
has three broad-based objectives: good
governance, export-driven economic growth,
and rural development, poverty alleviation
and empowerment through human resource
development. The expenditure priorities
during the life of the MTDS 2005–10 are set
down as
• rehabilitation and maintenance of
transport infrastructure
• promotion of income-earning
opportunities
• basic education
• development-oriented informal adult
education
• primary health care
• HIV-AIDS prevention
• law and justice.
The government has since launched the
Green Revolution package under the PRD,
which included increased subsidies for
agricultural inputs. Major incentives have
also been introduced to stimulate investment
in the mining and petroleum sector. These
two examples show that the government is
still fixated by the idea of minerals-led
development, with compensation for import-
substituting and other export sectors. The
allocation of 400 million kina in the 2006
Budget to the PNG–Australia gas pipeline
project as an equity contribution supports this
assertion. The government’s use of increased
revenues from the mining sector to reduce
public debt does indicate an appreciation of
the need for better management of these
revenues and avoidance of rent-seeking
claims to the funds. The reinvestment of a large
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share of these funds in the mining sector
rather than into the building of replacement
assets, however, suggests only partial
understanding of the kind of management
needed.
A review of the MTDS (Mawuli et al.
2005) revealed serious shortcomings. One
was the government’s selection of priority
areas. The priority areas chosen constitute a
small component of large sectors. For
instance, primary health care is a small
component of the large health sector. In an
effort to implement the MTDS, up to 55 per
cent of the development budget has been
earmarked for these priority areas.
The MTDS does not show any recognition
of the importance of microeconomic reform.
Sweeping statements are made about land
(section 1.6), public sector reform (Chapter 5),
trade (section 1.4), investment (section 3.3),
privatisation (section 5.2.1) and credit (section
3.2.2). However, there is no discussion of the
kinds of reforms that need to be undertaken to
achieve better performance in these areas in
the 2006 National Budget. There seems to be
no concern that a disproportionate share of
the annual budget will be allocated to the
MTDS priority programs during the life of the
MTDS.
Likewise, the 2006 Budget ignores major
microeconomic reforms. While trade and
investment liberalisation are recognised,
other major areas are not. In the Budget
Speech, the Minister for Finance and
Treasury said that the final phase of the
current tariff reform program would be
implemented in 2006, with tariffs on a range
of goods being reduced by five percentage
points and tariffs reduced on a range of goods
that are not produced in Papua New Guinea.
Further, the government, rather worryingly,
announced that there would be a
comprehensive review of tariff structures
during 2006, even though a major review of
the tariff reform program was carried out only
two years ago. Protected industries continue,
however, to agitate for reversal of the tariff
reform program. Having gone this far with
tariff liberalisation, with only a few industries
still receiving high protection, a government
strongly committed to trade liberalisation
would surely find it unnecessary to hold
another extensive inquiry. The government
should simply go ahead and remove the
remaining tariffs. Another inquiry will only
provide an opportunity for vested interests
to push for renewed special treatment.
In the Budget Speech, the Treasurer also
promised that the government would continue
implementing the FIAS recommendations for
improvements in the legislative environment
for investment. Progress on this front has
been very slow. Hopefully, the ‘red tape’ of
regulation can also be substantially reduced
so that the processes involved in setting up
businesses can be substantially simplified.
On the provision of utility services, the
Treasurer announced that ‘government will
also look at options to improve the service
provided to consumers by utility providers’
(Papua New Guinea 2005:n.p.). This statement
appears to indicate a very half-hearted
commitment to reform in this important area.
Several surveys of private firms undertaken
by the Institute of National Affairs and also
the business-cost survey by Duncan and
Lawson (1997) found that the high cost and
unreliability of utility services is one of Papua
New Guinea’s most pressing concerns. If the
government is serious about establishing an
investor-friendly environment, it must focus
on reform in this area.
Tax incentives aimed at boosting
investment in the tourism industry, including
double deductions for advertising expenses
and accelerated depreciation provisions for
capital expenditures on tourist facilities,
were also announced in the budget. Despite
many studies demonstrating that tax relief
is a minimal influence in investors’
consideration of investment possibilities
across countries, governments persist in
going down this path. Such actions do not
address any of the obstacles noted earlier to
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the development of tourism in Papua New
Guinea. For agriculture, the budget again
focuses on providing tax incentives for
investment. More than anything, these
policies signify a ‘policy vacuum’, an
inability to come to grips with the obstacles
to development of these very important areas
of the economy. No doubt the rural areas will
welcome the promised improvement in
public services to be delivered through the
District Services Improvement Program,
which is an attempt to improve security,
medical, postal, telecommunication, water,
and other services gradually. On public
sector reform more generally, while the
budget mentioned the Public Sector Right-
sizing Committee report and made broad
statements about the conclusions, it did not
elaborate on the implementation of the
committee’s recommendations.
According to the Treasurer’s 2006 Budget
presentation, the government recognises that
the private sector is the engine of economic
growth and that it ‘is still not growing fast
enough to provide the income earning
opportunities that are needed’ (Papua New
Guinea 2005:n.p.). But, out of a total 25 pages,
the Treasurer’s devotes only one to general
statements about public sector reform and one
other to microeconomic reforms such as
improving the investment environment and
regulatory control by the Independent
Consumer and Competition Commission over
telecommunications and coastal shipping.
The themes in the Program for Recovery and
Development, the Medium-Term Develop-
ment Strategy, and the 2006 Budget indicate
either ignorance of the importance of micro-
economic reform or an unwillingness to
entertain needed reforms due to the influence
of those benefiting from the status quo. It is
difficult to distinguish between these two
possibilities. But, if the microeconomic
foundations for sustained economic growth
are not emphasised and implemented, gains
from the recent short period of macroeconomic
stability and modest growth will disappear
into thin air. This government, which has
almost served a full term of five years, appears
to have lost a golden opportunity to build the
microeconomic foundations for sustained
economic growth and development.
Conclusions
The tensions and problems arising from
rapid population growth will only intensify
in Papua New Guinea, with the number of
people in the 15–29 year age old group
increasing by about 1 million over the next 25
years. Governments therefore face an
unenviable task in trying to create an
environment for rapid growth in investment
that will provide the job opportunities that
these young people will increasingly expect.
The current government has done an
excellent job in achieving good
macroeconomic policy and outcomes, but
over the years this has proven to be a
relatively easy task in Papua New Guinea.
The really difficult task, one that most
governments have been unwilling to face, is
developing microeconomic institutions and
policies that promote the private sector, the
engine of economic growth.
Like earlier governments, the current
government has been fixated on a mining-
led development strategy. The management
of the large revenue flows from mining has
been poor, however, with little to show in the
form of replacement assets for the depleted
mineral resources. If management of these
revenue flows cannot be improved, it may be
best to leave the resources in the ground.
Appropriately, the current government has
used some of the increased revenues from
the recent high mineral and petroleum prices
to pay down a substantial part of the public
debt, although there is still quite a way to go
to reach what is considered to be a prudential
debt/GDP ratio. Still, there is little indication
that the government is aware of the need for
a different development strategy and for
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reducing the reliance on mining. The
agricultural sector and tourism would seem
to be the areas on which to base rapid,
sustainable economic growth that is widely
distributed. However, significant develop-
ment of these sectors requires microeconomic
reform in several areas.
This review has shown that micro-
economic reform is possible in Papua New
Guinea if it is based on sound theoretical and
empirical foundations, adequately recognises
the political and cultural context, has a
political ‘champion’ who promotes owner-
ship of the reforms through public education,
and there is appropriate packaging and
sequencing of the reforms. Extensive policy
discussion is not easily translated into policy,
law and implementation. This has been
particularly true for the land reform debate.
The timing, packaging and marketing of the
reform are important. There is no external
blueprint to follow. Papua New Guinea must
therefore decide on its long-term goals and
strategies and initiate microeconomic reforms
that will provide the foundation for sustained
economic growth and development.
Unfortunately, the current government
has so far shown little inclination to become
fully engaged with the necessary
microeconomic reforms. It appears uncertain
about completing the trade liberalisation
reform program and half-hearted about
reforming essential services and the public
sector. It seems bereft of ideas for the crucial
agricultural and tourism sectors, resorting
in the budget to the disproved mechanism of
tax incentives. One area of hope is land
reform, where the maturity of the debate over
the issue of mobilisation of customary-
owned land has been encouraging. The
challenge, of course, will be transforming
recommendations and debate into legislation
and action.
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